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Abstract
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion, that is, when a sender
has to persuade multiple receivers, possibly having heterogenous beliefs, with the same
information for all. We show that public persuasion constrains the sender in how he
can influence the beliefs of receivers: if the sender wants to influence the beliefs of one
particular receiver, he loses all controls over the beliefs of the others. This observation
partially generalizes to targeted persuasion.
Keywords: Public, targeted, persuasion, multiple priors, splitting, concavification.
1 Introduction
This short paper studies the problem of public persuasion. The leading examples we have
in mind are how advertising campaigns persuade consumers to adopt a firm’s products, how
public appearances on social and mass media persuade electors to vote for a politician, how
national health campaigns persuade individuals to quit smoking, to immunize or to exercise,
to name just a few.
A common feature of all the above examples is that a sender needs to persuade multiple
receivers, possibly having diverse opinions, with the same information for all. In other words,
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the sender cannot target its information release to each receiver (or groups of receivers), but
has to release the same information to all receivers. This has important implications for
the distributions of posterior beliefs a sender can generate: the likelihood ratios of any two
receivers, i.e., the ratios of posterior beliefs over prior beliefs, must be collinear (see Lemma 1,
condition (2)(ii)). This collinearity condition encapsulates the constraints public persuasion
imposes on the sender. The best the sender can do is to “split” the prior beliefs of a selected
but unique receiver. The posterior beliefs of all other receivers are then uniquely pinned
down as a consequence of the collinearity condition. This is the main economic insight of
our analysis and underlines our main result, the complete characterization of the sender’s
optimal payoff (Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that this insight generalizes without much
difficulties to targeted persuasion, i.e., to situations where the sender can target its release
of information to groups of individuals.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the growing literature on Bayesian per-
suasion, as defined by Kamenica and Gentskow. In Kamenica and Gentskow (2011), there is
a single sender and a single receiver, sharing a common prior. In Alonso and Caˆmara (2015a),
there is a single receiver, whose beliefs may differ from the sender’s beliefs. In Alonso and
Caˆmara (2015b), there are multiple receivers, but they all share the same prior beliefs as
the sender. The present paper generalizes all these contributions in assuming multiple re-
ceivers with heterogenous beliefs. Moreover, the emphasis of the paper complements the
work of Alonso and Caˆmara (2015b). We are interested in characterizing the optimal payoff
the sender can obtain in general persuasion games with multiple receivers, while Alonso and
Caˆmara are interested in particular games, namely voting games, and in understanding how
the voting procedure impacts on the information release.
Mathematically, the paper is related to the seminal work of Aumann and Maschler (1967,
reprinted in 1995) on zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. We
generalize the “splitting” lemma to account for multiple receivers with heterogeneous be-
liefs and, as Aumann and Maschler, characterize the optimal payoff of the sender as the
concavification of a certain function.1
2 The general setup
We consider a reduced-form model, where the sender’s payoff depends directly on profiles of
posterior beliefs and states of the world. As we will see later, many economic applications
reduce to our model.
1Kamenica and Gentskow refer to a splitting as Bayes plausible posteriors and to the concavification of a
function as the convex hull of a function.
2
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world and I an index set, e.g., I = {1, . . . , n} or
I = [0, 1]. Let (pi)i∈I be a profile of prior beliefs, with pi ∈ int∆(Ω) for each i ∈ I, and
p∗ ∈ ∆(Ω) the sender’s prior beliefs.2
Prior to learning the state of the world, the sender has the opportunity to commit to
release some public information. Formally, the sender commits to a signaling function pi :
Ω → ∆(S), with S a finite set of signals.3 We write ps,pii for the posterior of pi conditional
on the signal s when the sender commits to pi, i.e.,
ps,pii (ω) =
pi(s|ω)pi(ω)∑
ω∈Ω pi(s|ω)pi(ω)
,
if
∑
ω∈Ω pi(s|ω)pi(ω) > 0, and is arbitrary otherwise. Finally, if the profile of posterior beliefs
is (psi )i∈I and the state of the world is ω, the sender’s payoff is u((p
s
i )i∈I , ω). This completes
the description of our reduced-form model.
The sender’s objective is therefore to choose a signaling function pi so as to maximize his
expected payoff, i.e., to solve the optimization problem:
max
pi:Ω→∆(S)
∑
s,ω
u((ps,pii )i∈I , ω)pi(s|ω)p∗(ω), . (P)
Before solving (P), we present two sets of economic applications.
Applications I: Persuading an audience. As a first set of applications, consider per-
suasion games between a sender and multiple receivers, with possibly heterogenous beliefs.
There is a population of receivers I = {1, . . . , n}, with pi ∈ int∆(Ω) the prior belief of
receiver i. Receiver i has a non-empty compact set of actions Ai and a utility function
vi : ×i∈IAi × Ω→ R.4 The sender’s utility is u˜ : ×i∈IAi × Ω→ R. For each public signal
s, let a∗((psi )i∈I) be a Nash equilibrium of the game between receivers, when the profile of
posteriors is (psi )i∈I (if two signals generate the same set of posteriors, the same Nash equi-
librium is selected). Letting u((psi )i∈I , ω) := u˜(a
∗((psi )i∈I), ω), the sender’s optimal choice is
equivalent to the optimization problem (P). The seminal problem analyzed in Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011) is a special case of our more general model. As concrete applications,
receivers may be consumers, who have to decide whether to purchase a good, or voters, who
have to decide whether to vote for a candidate.
Applications II: Bayesian persuasion with ambiguity. As a second set of applica-
2For simplicity, we assume that each prior pi has full support. A weaker assumption is to assume that
priors are absolutely continuous with respect to each others, i.e., pi(ω) > 0⇒ pj(ω) > 0 for all (i, j, ω). This
weaker assumption does not affect our results.
3We argue later that the finiteness of S is without loss of generality.
4Assume that each vi is continuous in (ai)i∈I and concave in ai.
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tions, consider persuasion games between a sender and a receiver, who is ambiguous about
the state of the world. The receiver has maxmin preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989),
with P := {pi : i ∈ I} the set of prior beliefs of the receiver.5 The receiver has a non-empty
compact set of actions A and his utility function is v : A×Ω→ R, while the sender’s utility
is u˜ : A× Ω→ R. We assume full Bayesian updating, which implies that given a signaling
function pi and a signal s, the receiver updates his set of prior beliefs into the set of posteriors
beliefs {ps,pii : i ∈ I}. For each signal s, the receiver chooses an action in:
A∗((psi )i∈I) = arg max
a∈A
min
i∈I
∑
ω∈Ω
v(a, ω)psi (ω),
where {psi : i ∈ I} is the set of posteriors. Let a∗((psi )i∈I) be an optimal action of the receiver
in A∗((psi )i∈I) (if the receiver is indifferent between several actions, then choose arbitrarily).
Letting u((psi )i∈I , ω) := u˜(a
∗((psi )i∈I), ω), the sender’s optimal choice is yet again equivalent
to the optimization problem (P). As a concrete example, consider the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Pharmaceutical companies (the senders) need to provide information to health agencies
(the receivers), e.g., the European Medicine Agency or the Food and Drug Administration,
about the effectiveness of proposed medicines in order to get the authorization to sell. Phar-
maceutical companies commit to perform and release results from all clinical trials.6 Health
agencies have then to decide whether the medicine can be put on the market. Even if health
authorities have the results of all clinical trials, they still face large uncertainties and are
likely to entertain ranges of estimates about the effectiveness of the proposed medicines. A
simple precautionary principle would require health agencies to take decisions based on their
most pessimistic estimates, i.e., to adopt the maxmin criterion.
3 Main results
3.1 Necessary and sufficient conditions for splitting with multiple
priors
Notations. For two |Ω|-dimensional vectors p and q, define the |Ω|-dimensional vector q/p
as follows: (q/p)(ω) = q(ω)/p(ω) if p(ω) > 0, (q/p)(ω) = 0 if p(ω) = 0. For a |Ω|-dimensional
vector p, we write ‖p‖ for the `1-norm of p, i.e.,
∑
ω∈Ω |p(ω)|.
5The axiomatization of Gilboa and Schmeidler requires the set of prior beliefs P to be non-empty, compact
and convex.
6Indeed, recent developments in the pharmaceutical industry have seen firms like GlaxoSmithKline to
voluntarily commit to release results from all clinical trials within a reasonable time frame. E.g., the FDA
requires all clinical trials to be made available within one year.
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We first characterize the set of posterior beliefs the sender can induce with a commitment
to a signaling function. When I is the singleton {i}, the sufficient and necessary condition
to split the unique prior belief pi into the posterior beliefs (p
s
i )s∈S is that pi is in the convex
hull of {psi : s ∈ S} (see Aumann and Maschler, 1995). With multiple priors, however, the
condition is not sufficient; an additional condition is needed. The following lemma establishes
necessary and sufficient conditions to induce the profile of posterior beliefs (psi )i∈I for each
signal s ∈ S, starting from the profile of prior beliefs (pi)i∈I .
Lemma 1. Let S be a finite set and (psi )i∈I be a set of posterior beliefs for each s ∈ S. The
following statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a signaling function pi : Ω→ ∆(S) such that psi = ps,pii for all (i, s) ∈ I×S.
2. There exists (λsi )i,s, with λ
s
i ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
s λ
s
i = 1 for all (i, s) ∈ I × S, such that
(i) (1, . . . , 1) ∈∑s λsi (psi/pi) for all (i, s) ∈ I × S.
(ii) λsi (p
s
i/pi) = λ
s
j(p
s
j/pj) for all (i, j, s) ∈ I × I × S.
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Few comments are in order. If I is the singleton
{i}, then (2)(ii) is vacuously satisfied, while (2)(i) simply means that pi is in the convex hull
of {psi : s ∈ S}, which is the classic splitting result. More generally, a necessary condition
for splitting multiple priors is that each prior pi is included in the convex hull of the set of
posteriors {psi : s ∈ S}, for each i ∈ I. However, this is not sufficient. For instance, with
two states of the world, condition (2)(ii) of Lemma 1 implies that for all (pi, pj) and ω, if
pi(ω) ≥ pj(ω), then psi (ω) ≥ psj(ω) (and the opposite if pi(ω) ≤ pj(ω)). Conditions (2)(i) and
(2)(ii) are geometric conditions in the space of likelihood ratios. Condition (2)(i) states that
the unit vector is in the convex hull of the set of likelihood ratios {psi/pi : s ∈ S} for each
i, while condition (2)(ii) states that the likelihood ratios (psi/pi)i are collinear for each s.
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Lastly, condition (2)(ii) implies that the two |Ω|-dimensional vectors psi/pi and psj/pj have
unit cross-ratios, hence the Hilbert distance between these two vectors is zero. In Appendix
B, we prove that this implies that the Hilbert distance between pi and pj is the same as
between psi and p
s
j for every (i, j, s). We prove similarly that the Hilbert distance between pi
and psi is the same as between pj and p
s
j for every (i, j, s). This provides a partial geometric
characterization of the splittings in the space of probabilities (to not be confused with the
space of likelihood ratios). Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain a complete
geometric characterization for the space of probabilities.
7If we adopt the weaker assumption mentioned in footnote 2, the required modification is to write (2)(i)
as: pi =
∑
s λ
s
ip
s
i for all (i, s).
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Example 1. There are two states of the world ω1 and ω2, two prior beliefs p1 and p2, and two
signals s1 and s2. For concreteness, p1 = (1/2, 1/2) and p2 = (1/4, 3/4). We claim that there
exists a signaling function that induces the posteriors (ps11 , p
s1
2 ) = ((1/3, 2/3), (1/7, 6/7)) and
(ps21 , p
s2
2 ) = ((2/3, 1/3), (2/5, 3/5)). To see this, we apply the second statement of Lemma
1. The likelihood ratios are given by (ps11 /p1) = (2/3, 4/3), (p
s2
1 /p1) = (4/3, 2/3), (p
s1
2 /p2) =
(4/7, 8/7), (ps22 /p2) = (8/5, 4/5), and it is easy to verify that condition (2)(i) and (2)(ii)
are satisfied with (λs11 , λ
s2
1 ) = (1/2, 1/2) and (λ
s1
2 , λ
s2
2 ) = (7/12, 5/12). See Figure 1 for a
geometric illustration (the likelihood ratios are represented by black disks). The likelihood
ratios in state s1 (resp., s2) are on the same ray, i.e., they are collinear (condition (2)(ii)).
Moreover, the unit vector is on the lines connecting the likelihood ratios in states s1 and s2
(condition (2)(i)).
-
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Figure 1: The geometry of splittings in the space of likelihood ratios (i = 1, 2, s = s1, s2)
3.2 Characterization of the sender’s optimal payoff
The second statement in Lemma 1 has one crucial implication: if we choose a splitting of an
arbitrary prior, then conditions (2)(i) and (2)(ii) pin down all other posteriors. To see this,
choose an arbitrary i∗ ∈ I, and let (λsi∗ , psi∗)s be a splitting of pi∗ , i.e., pi∗ =
∑
s λ
s
i∗p
s
i∗ and
λi∗ ∈ ∆(S). From conditions (i) and (ii), we have that
λsi = λ
s
i∗‖pi · (psi∗/pi∗)‖,
6
and
psi =
pi · (psi∗/pi∗)
‖pi · (psi∗/pi∗)‖
.
Consequently, we can view the profile of posteriors (psi )i∈I as the image of a map f : ∆(Ω)→
×i∈I∆(Ω), where the i-th component is given by
fi(p
s
i∗) :=
pi · (psi∗/pi∗)
‖pi · (psi∗/pi∗)‖
,
for some fixed but arbitrary i∗ ∈ I. In words, fi(psi∗) ∈ ∆(Ω) is the posterior belief of pi if the
signal s is observed and (λsi∗ , p
s
i∗)s is a splitting of pi∗ . It is worth stressing that fi(p
s
i∗) only
depends on psi∗ and not on the entire splitting (λ
s
i∗ , p
s
i∗)s. As we shall see later, this property
is specific to public persuasion; it does not extend to targeted persuasion, where different
groups may receive different signals. The choice of the index i∗ ∈ I is immaterial because all
prior beliefs have the same support. To ease notation, we write p for the fixed but arbitrary
prior pi∗ in the sequel.
Let Up,p∗ : ∆(Ω)→ R be the function, parameterized by (p, p∗), defined by
Up,p∗(q) :=
∑
ω
u(f(q), ω)
p∗(ω)
p(ω)
q(ω),
for all q ∈ ∆Ω. For any function U : ∆(Ω)→ R, we write cavU for the concavification of U ,
i.e., the smallest concave function above U . (See Aumman and Maschler, 1967, reprinted in
1995, for details.)
Theorem 1. The sender’s optimal payoff is cavUp,p∗(p).
Theorem 1 is proved at the end of this section. As was already mentioned, Theorem 1
implies that the sender can restrict attention to finite sets of signals with at most |Ω| elements.
Indeed, by definition of the concavification, there exists a set S such that (cavUp,p∗(p), p) =∑
s∈S λ
s(Up,q∗(p
s), ps), with
∑
s∈S λ
s = 1 and λs ∈ [0, 1] for all s ∈ S. Since each point
(Up,p∗(p
s), ps) belongs to {(q, u) ∈ ∆Ω×R : u = Up,p∗(q)}, an |Ω| − 1-dimensional space, the
observation follows from Carathe´odory theorem.
In many economic applications of interest, there are only two states of the world, e.g., the
defendant is guilty or innocent, the drug is better than a placebo or not, the quality of the
good is high or low, to name just a few. With two states of the world, the characterization
of the optimal payoff is simple. With a slight abuse of notation, for each i ∈ I, let pi be
the probability of the first state. Assume that there exists i∗ ∈ I such that pi∗ ≤ pi for
all i ∈ I. This assumption is satisfied when {pi : i ∈ I} is a compact set, as in our two
7
leading applications. (If this assumption fails, pick any arbitrary prior.) With two states of
the world, the i-th component fi of the function f is given by
fi(q) :=
ciq
1 + q(ci − 1) ,
for all q ∈ [0, 1], with
ci :=
1− pi∗
pi∗
pi
1− pi .
Note that fi is strictly increasing, concave and satisfies fi(0) = 0, fi(1) = 1, and fi(q) ≥ q for
all q ∈ [0, 1]. The maximization problem (P) then amounts to choose two posterior beliefs
(psi∗ , p
s′
i∗), with p
s
i∗ ≤ pi∗ ≤ ps′i∗ , such that
ps
′
i∗ − pi∗
ps
′
i∗ − psi∗
Upi∗ ,p∗(p
s
i∗) +
pi∗ − psi∗
ps
′
i∗ − psi∗
Upi∗ ,p∗(p
s′
i∗)
is maximized. (If ps
′
i∗ = p
s
i∗ , the value is Upi∗ ,p∗(pi∗).) We now illustrate our results with the
help of a simple example.
Example 2. This example is adapted from Aumann and Hart (2003). There is one sender
and one receiver, and two states of the world ω1 and ω2. The receiver has to choose an action
in {LL,L,M,R,RR} after observing the sender signal s. We assume that the receiver has
maxmin preferences and prior-by-prior updating. The profile of prior beliefs of the receiver
is (1
3
+ i)i∈[0,1/3], while the sender’s prior belief is 1/2 (with a slight abuse of notation, we
only refer to the beliefs about state ω1).
8 The payoffs are (the first entry in each cell is the
sender’s payoff):
state ω1:
LL L M R RR
0, 10 1, 8 0, 5 1, 0 0,−8
state ω2:
LL L M R RR
0,−8 1, 0 0, 5 1, 8 0, 10
As argued, it is without loss of generality to assume that the sender only uses two signals,
which we denote s1 and s2. It is easy to verify that i
∗ = 0, which corresponds to the prior
1/3. Moreover, if the sender splits the prior 1/3 into (ps, λs)s∈{s1,s2}, the set of posteriors is
the closed interval [f0(p
s), f1/3(p
s)] when the signal is s, s ∈ {s1, s2}. By construction, f0 is
the identity function, while f1/3 is given by
f1/3(q) =
4q
1 + 3q
,
8Equivalently, the set of prior beliefs of the receiver is
[
1
3 ,
2
3
]
.
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for all q ∈ [0, 1]. For instance, if q = 1/4, then f1/3(1/4) = 4/7.
We now compute the function q 7→ U1/3,1/2(q). Whenever the set of posteriors is [q, f1/3(q)],
the receiver chooses an action a∗([q, f1/3(q)]) that maximizes his worst expected payoff (if
there are several, choose one that favors the sender), thus giving the sender’s payoff in state
ω: u(a∗([q, f1/3(q)], ω). For instance, if the set of posteriors is [1/4, 4/7], the receiver’s opti-
mal action is M and the sender’s payoff is 0. Indeed, if the receiver chooses M , he guarantees
himself a payoff of 5, while if he chooses LL (resp., L, R and RR), the worst payoff is −7/2
(resp., 2, 24/7, and −2/7).
Since the sender’s payoff is independent of the state of the world, the function U1/3,1/2 is
then computed as
u(a∗([q, f1/3(q)])
(
1/2
1/3
q +
1− (1/2)
1− (1/3)(1− q)
)
=
3
4
u
(
a∗([q, f1/3(q)])
)
(1 + q).
Figure 2 plots the function U1/3,1/2 and its concavification.
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Figure 2: The payoff function (bold) and its concavification (dots)
Notice that the concavification is piecewise linear, with the equation of the upper piece
given by (3/4)q + (3/4). It follows that the optimal payoff to the sender is 1.
It is important to bear in mind that we cannot read from the figure what is the best
payoff to the sender if his prior was different, since the function U1/3,1/2 is parameterized by
it. Nor can we read from the figure the sender’s payoff following the splitting. Yet, we can
learn about the optimal splittings. For instance, an optimal splitting is (1/13, 3/4), with
induced sets of posteriors
[
1
13
, 1
4
]
and
[
3
4
, 12
13
]
. Intuitively, if the set of posteriors is
[
1
13
, 1
4
]
(resp.,
[
3
4
, 12
13
]
), the receiver’s optimal action is R (resp., L), which guarantees a payoff of 1
to the sender. Partial revelation of information is therefore optimal.
Example 3. This second example is nearly identical to the previous one. The only differences
are the payoff matrices:
9
ω1:
L R
1,−1 0, 1 ω2:
L R
1, 1 0,−1
Let q∗ = 1
3
(√
5
2
− 1
)
< 1
3
be the solution to the equation 1 − 2 4q
1+3q
= 2q − 1, i.e., q∗ is
the belief that makes the receiver indifferent between playing L and R. The sender’s optimal
pure action is L if q < q∗ and R, otherwise. (We do not consider mixed actions in this
example.)
-
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Figure 3: The payoff function (bold) and its concavification (dots)
The sender’s optimal payoff is 1
2
2+
√
5
2
4−
√
5
2
< 1. Moreover, this requires the sender to reveal
partial information about the state of the world, since the optimal splitting is (q∗, 1). We
can contrast this result with the unambiguous case (unique priors). It is clear that if the
agent thinks that the state of the world is ω1 with probability 1/3, then the best for the
sender is to remain silent. This would guarantee him a payoff of 1. We can easily modify
the example to obtain the converse, i.e., no information is released with multiple priors, but
some information is released with unique priors.
We conclude this section with the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof . Choose some arbitrary index i∗ ∈ I. If the sender commits to pi, his expected payoff
is:
10
∑
s,ω
u((ps,pii )i∈I , ω)p
∗(ω)pi(s|ω) =
∑
s,ω
u((ps,pii )i∈I , ω)
p∗(ω)
pi∗(ω)
pi∗(ω)pi(s|ω)
=
∑
s,ω
u((ps,pii )i∈I , ω)
p∗(ω)
pi∗(ω)
ps,pii∗ (ω)
(∑
ω
pi(s|ω)pi∗(ω)
)
=
∑
s
(∑
ω
u(f(psi∗), ω)
p∗(ω)
pi∗(ω)
psi∗(ω)
)
λsi∗
=
∑
s
Upi∗ ,p∗(p
s
i∗)λ
s
i∗ ,
with λsi∗ ∈ [0, 1] for all s,
∑
s λ
s
i∗ = 1, and
∑
s λ
s
i∗p
s
i∗ = pi∗ ; the second equality follows
from the definition of total probabilities and the third equality from Lemma 1. Thus, the
maximization problem is equivalent to
max
(λs,ps)s
∑
s
Up,p∗(p
s)λs,
subject to
∑
λsps = p, where p is the arbitrarily chosen prior belief pi∗ . It is well-known that
the solution corresponds to the concavification of Up,p∗ evaluated at p. 
3.3 Beyond public persuasion: targeted persuasion
A central feature of our model is that persuasion is public. While it is a natural assumption
in many economic applications (and certainly the only meaningful assumption in sender-
receiver games with ambiguity), “targeted” communication best models other applications.
For instance, in electoral campaigns, politicians and their teams target different groups of
voters with specific messages. Door-to-door canvassing even makes it possible to individually
persuade voters. Similarly, social media like Facebook or Twitter make it possible to taylor
advertisement campaigns at the individual level. We now explain how our analysis generalizes
to targeted persuasion.
Let K be an index set and κ : I → K an onto map, with the interpretation that κ(i)
is the target group individual i belongs to.9 Individual i in group κ(i) receives the private
signal sκ(i) ∈ Sκ(i). We stress that all individuals in group k receive the same signal. Public
and individual persuasion are thus two polar cases. Public persuasion corresponds to the case
where κ(i) = k for all i, while individual persuasion corresponds to the case, where K = I
9An alternative interpretation is that κ−1(k) indexes the set of prior beliefs of individual k, in a world
with maxmin preferences.
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and κ is the identity mapping. Throughout, all sets of signals are finite.
As before, prior to learning the state of the world, the sender commits to a signaling
function pi : Ω → ∆(S), where S := ×k∈KSk. Denote IS := {(i, sk) ∈ I × Sk : k = κ(i)}.
We assume that the sender’s payoff is a function u of the profile of posteriors (p
sκ(i)
i )i∈I , with
p
sκ(i)
i ∈ ∆(Ω × S−κ(i)) for all (i, sκ(i)) ∈ IS, and the state of the world ω. Indeed, in the
(unmodeled) game that follows the release of information, a strategy for individual i specifies
an action for each private signal sk(i) he might receive, and individual i’s payoff depends on
his beliefs about ω and s−κ(i) (through the strategies of others). This leads us to characterize
the distribution of posteriors over states of the world and private signals of others the sender
can achieve with targeted persuasion.
Lemma 2. Let S be a finite set and (p
sκ(i)
i )i∈I a profile of posterior beliefs for each s ∈ S
(p
sκ(i)
i ∈ ∆(Ω× S−κ(i)) for each (i, sk(i)) ∈ IS). The following statements are equivalent:
1. There exists a signaling function pi : Ω → ∆(S) such that psκ(i)i = p
sκ(i),pi
i for all
(i, sκ(i)) ∈ IS.
2. There exists (λ
sκ(i)
i )i,sκ(i), with λ
sκ(i)
i ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
sκ(i)∈Sκ(i) λ
sκ(i)
i = 1 for all (i, sκ(i)) ∈
IS, such that
(i) (1, . . . , 1) ∈∑(sκ(i),s−κ(i)) λsκ(i)i (psκ(i)i (·, s−κ(i))/pi) for all i ∈ I.
(ii) λ
sκ(i)
i (p
sκ(i)
i (·, s−κ(i))/pi) = λ
sκ(j)
j (p
sκ(j)
j (·, s−κ(j))/pj) for all (i, j, s) ∈ I × I × S.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in Appendix C. Lemma 2 is a direct generalization of
Lemma 1. In particular, if we choose an arbitrary index i∗ and a splitting (p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ , λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ )sκ(i∗)
of pi∗ , then the posterior p
sκ(i)
i of pi conditional on sκ(i) is uniquely determined, with:
p
sκ(i)
i (ω, s−κ(i)) =
λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗
(
p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ (ω, s−κ(i∗))/pi∗(ω)
)
pi(ω)∑
(ω,s−κ(i))
λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗
(
p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ (ω, s−κ(i∗))/pi∗(ω)
)
pi(ω)
,
for all (ω, s−κ(i)), if the denominator is positive. It follows that p
sκ(i)
i is a function f
sκ(i)
i of
the splitting (p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ , λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ )sκ(i∗) . It is worth stressing one important difference with public
persuasion. In general, the posterior p
sκ(i)
i of pi depends on the entire splitting of pi∗ , i.e., on
the chosen distribution over posteriors. When i ∈ κ−1(κ(i∗)), however, the posterior psκ(i)i
of pi is only a function of p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ . This case is in fact the only relevant case with public
persuasion, explaining the characterization we have obtained in Lemma 1.
Following the exact same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can express the sender’s
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expected payoff as:
∑
sκ(i∗)
 ∑
(ω,s−κ(i∗))
u((f
sκ(i)
i ((p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ , λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ )sκ(i∗))i∈I , ω)p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ (ω, s−κ(i∗))
p∗(ω)
pi∗(ω)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Upi∗ ,p∗ ((p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ ,λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ )sκ(i∗) )
λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ .
Theorem 2. The sender’s optimal payoff is the value of the maximization problem:
max
(p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ ,λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ )sκ(i∗)
∑
si
Upi∗ ,p∗((p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ , λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ )sκ(i∗))λ
sκi∗
i∗ ,
subject to
∑
(sκ(i∗),s−κ(i∗))
λ
sκ(i∗)
i∗ p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ (·, s−κ(i∗)) = pi∗, if it exists.
Few remarks are in order. First, unlike the case of public persuasion, the solution does
not correspond to the concavification of the function Up∗,pi∗ , as the function itself depends on
the choice of splittings. Second, if Sk = Sk′ for all (k, k
′), then public persuasion is admissible
and, thus, the sender is always at least better off by targeting his persuasion.10 Third, if a
solution to the maximization problem is such that λ
s∗
κ(i∗)
i∗ = 1 and p
s∗
κ(i∗)
i∗ (·, s∗−κ(i∗)) = pi∗ for
some (s∗κ(i∗), s
∗
−κ(i∗)), then the maximum is also achievable with public persuasion. This is
indeed trivial since the later solution corresponds to no information being released, which
is always possible. Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain sharper results, without
imposing additional structure on the problem.
4 An economic application: persuading a committee
An expert would like to persuade a committee, composed of an odd number n of members, to
adopt a project. The project is adopted if a majority of members votes for its adoption. The
project is either profitable (state ω1) or unprofitable (state ω2). If the project is profitable
(resp., unprofitable), a committee member derives a utility of one from adopting (resp.,
rejecting) the project and of zero from rejecting (resp., adopting) it. Hence, a committee
member would like to adopt the project if and only if it is profitable.
The expert derives utility from the decision chosen by the committee as well as from his
reputation. Regardless of the project’s profitability, the expert gets a payoff of one if his
project is adopted and of zero, otherwise.
Intuitively, committee members expect a reputable expert to not surprise them. After
10Public persuasion corresponds to p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ (ω, s−κ(i∗)) = 0 whenever s−κ(i∗) differs from the profile
(sκ(i∗))k 6=κ(i∗).
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all, the expert can commit to fully disclose the state of the world. Formally, suppose that
committee member i is led to believe that the project is profitable with probability psi . The
quantity − log(psi ), known as the self-information or surprisal of the probability (psi , 1 − psi )
in state ω1, captures the “surprise” in observing a positive profit when one believes that this
occurs with probability psi . Put it differently, the self-information of (p
s
i , 1− psi ) in state ω1 is
equivalent to the Kullback-Leiber divergence of the probability (psi , 1−psi ) from the probability
(1, 0), i.e., the probability that assigns probability one to the project being profitable (which
would be the member’s posterior if the expert had committed to fully disclose the state). We
thus model the reputation cost in state ω as the average surprisal, i.e., as
δ
1
n
(∑
i
− log(psi (ω))
)
,
when (psi )i is the profile of beliefs of the committee members. The parameter δ ≥ 0 captures
the disutility of having a bad reputation. In other words, this simple model captures the
trade-off between current reward and future reward (through an expert’s reputation) an
expert faces in recommending decisions. As a concrete illustration, pharmaceutical companies
design clinical trials with the aim at getting their drugs approved by the competent agencies,
e.g., the Food and Drug Administration in the US or the European Medicines Agency. In
circumstances where the design of clinical trials was fraught and led to the approval of
ineffective or even unsafe drugs, pharmaceutical companies are not only sanctioned with
fines, but also suffers reputation’s losses, which lead to lower approval’s probabilities in the
future.
The prior beliefs of the committee members are (pi)i, while the expert’s prior belief is p
∗.
Without loss of generality, we assume that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. Focusing on equilibria in
weakly dominant strategies, the project is adopted whenever psdn/2e(ω1) ≥ 1/2, i.e., whenever
the median member prefers to adopt the project. (If indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the project, a member accepts.)
It follows that the expert’s utility u((psi )i, ω) is
1{psdn/2e(ω1)≥1/2} − δ
1
n
(∑
i
− log(psi (ω))
)
.
Note that when δ = 0, we have a model of pure persuasion: the expert wants the project to
be adopted, regardless of the state.
To simplify the exposition, we choose to split the beliefs of the median member, i.e., we
choose the index i∗ = dn/2e in calculating Upi∗ ,p∗ . If the median member has posterior belief
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q, the expert’s payoff function is:
Updn/2e,p∗(q) =
(
p∗
pdn/2e
q +
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e (1− q)
)
1{q≥1/2}
+δ
1
n
∑
i
(
log
(
ciq
1 + (ci − 1)q
)
p∗
pdn/2e
q + log
(
1− ciq
1 + (ci − 1)q
)
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e (1− q)
)
,
with
ci =
1− pdn/2e
pdn/2e
pi
1− pi .
Note that the first term corresponds to the payoff the expert derives from the adoption of
the project (which occurs if the median member believes that the project is profitable with
probability at least one-half). The second term corresponds to the reputation cost (more
accurately, it is the negative of the reputation cost). It is always negative, takes value zero
at q = 0 or q = 1, i.e., when the expert designs a fully informative signaling function, and
crucially convex in q.
Proposition 1. If p
∗
pdn/2e
1
2
≥ Updn/2e,p∗(1/2), the concavification of Updn/2e,p∗ is given by
p∗
pdn/2e
q,
for all q ∈ [0, 1]. If p∗
pdn/2e
1
2
< Updn/2e,p∗(1/2), the concavification of Updn/2e,p∗ is given by2Updn/2e,p∗(1/2)q if q ≤ 1/22 [Updn/2e,p∗(1)− Updn/2e,p∗(1/2)] q + 2Updn/2e,p∗(1/2)− Updn/2e,p∗(1) if q > 1/2.
The formal proof of Proposition 1 is relegated to Appendix D. Yet, the intuition is
relatively clear. To start with, suppose that the reputation cost is not too large (i.e., δ close
to zero) so that p
∗
pdn/2e
1
2
< Updn/2e,p∗(1/2). When the median member believes the project to
be profitable with probability at least one-half, the expert can secure the adoption of the
project by remaining silent. However, this wouldn’t minimize the reputation cost (unless
δ = 0). In order to minimize the reputation cost while securing the adoption of the project,
the best the expert can do is to disclose that the project is profitable only when it is and
to make the median member indifferent, otherwise.11 In other words, the expert generates
the two most extreme beliefs 1 and 1/2 that guarantee the project’s approval, and this is
the best he can do by convexity of the reputation cost. A similar reasoning applies when
11More formally, this corresponds to the splitting of pdn/2e > 1/2 into 1 and 1/2. The signaling function
λ, with λ(s1|ω1) = 2− (1/pdn/2e) and λ(s1|ω2) = 0, achieves that splitting.
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the median member believes the project to be profitable with probability less than one-half.
Alternatively, when the reputation cost is sufficiently large (i.e., δ large enough), the best
the expert can do is to fully disclose whether the project is profitable, as the expected cost
of surprising the committee is disproportionally larger than the gain of having the project
adopted.
Finally, note that
p∗
pdn/2e
− 2Updn/2e,p∗(1/2) =
− p∗
pdn/2e
δ
∑
i
1
n
log
(
ci
1+ci
)
− 1−p∗
1−pdn/2e
(
1 + δ
∑
i
1
n
log
(
1
1+ci
))
,
and is thus continuous in all parameters of the model. It follows that if we start from a
situation where p
∗
pdn/2e
− 2Updn/2e,p∗(1/2) > 0, local changes in the parameters won’t affect the
optimal information disclosure: the best would remain to fully disclose the state of the world.
Of course, the expert’s payoff will change so as to reflect the change in the beliefs. More
precisely, the expert’s payoff will change from p∗ to p∗, if the expert’s belief has changed from
p∗ to p∗. A similar argument applies if p
∗
pdn/2e
− 2Updn/2e,p∗(1/2) < 0. The optimal information
disclosure is therefore robust to the choice of parameters (at least generically).
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
(1) ⇒ (2). Let λsi =
∑
ω pi(s|ω)pi(ω). It immediately follows that
∑
s λ
s
ip
s
i = pi, i.e., (i)
holds. Moreover, for all ω ∈ Ω, we have
λsi (p
s
i (ω)/pi(ω)) = pi(s|ω) = λsj(psj(ω)/pj(ω)),
so that (ii) holds. Note that if there exists i such that λsi = 0, then pi(s|ω) = 0 for all ω. It
follows that λsj = 0 for all j, since pi and pj have full support.
(2)⇒ (1). Choose any i∗ ∈ I and let
pi(s|ω) := λ
s
i∗p
s
i∗(ω)
pi∗(ω)
.
This is well-defined since pi∗(ω) > 0. Moreover, since (i) is satisfied, we have that
∑
s pi(s|ω) =
16
1. The posterior of pi, conditional on s, is given by
pi(ω)λ
s
i∗(p
s
i∗(ω)/pi∗(ω))∑
ω pi(ω)λ
s
i∗(p
s
i∗(ω)/pi∗(ω))
=
pi(ω)λ
s
i (p
s
i (ω)/pi(ω))∑
ω pi(ω)λ
s
i (p
s
i (ω)/pi(ω))
= psi (ω),
where the first equality follows from (ii).
B Hilbert geometry
We introduce the Hilbert distance which helps in understanding the geometric of Lemma 1
on the simplex.
Definition 1. Hilbert distance.
We first define the Hilbert distance between two vectors x ∈ RK++ and y ∈ RK++.12 Let
M(x/y) =
inf{pi ∈ R++ : xk ≤ piyk ∀k ∈ K} if possible,+∞ otherwise,
and
m(x/y) = sup{µ ∈ R++ : µyk ≤ xk ∀k ∈ K}.
The Hilbert distance dH(x, y) between x and y is then as:
dH(x, y) = log
M(x/y)
m(x/y)
.
There is an alternative definition of the Hilbert distance on Euclidean spaces.13 Notice
that:
M(x/y) =
inf{pi ∈ R++ :
xk
yk
≤ pi ∀k ∈ K} if possible,
+∞ otherwise,
= max
k∈K
{
xk
yk
}
.
Similarly, m(x/y) = sup{µ ∈ R++ : µ ≤ xkyk ∀k ∈ K} = mink∈K
{
xk
yk
}
.
12The Hilbert distance can be defined more generally on any closed solid cone of a real Banach space (see
for instance Bushell, 1973).
13This is not true for the Hilbert distance on more general sets (see Bushell, 1973).
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It follows that the Hilbert distance between two probabilities pi and pj in ∆(Ω):
dH(pi, pjj) = log
maxω∈Ω
{
pi(ω)
pj(ω)
}
minω˜∈Ω
{
pi(ω˜)
pj(ω˜)
} = log [max
ω∈Ω
{
pi(ω)
pj(ω)
}
×max
ω˜∈Ω
{
1
pi(ω˜)
pj(ω˜)
}]
= log max
(ω,ω˜)∈Ω×Ω
{
pi(ω)pj(ω˜)
pj(ω)pi(ω˜)
}
.
Condition (2)(iii) of Lemma 1 then implies:
dH
(
psi/pi, p
s
j/pj
)
= log max
(ω,ω˜)∈Ω×Ω
 psi (ω)pi(ω) psj(ω˜)pj(ω˜)
psj(ω)
pj(ω)
psi (ω˜)
pi(ω˜)
 = log 1 = 0.
More generally, it is easy to see that two vectors are collinear if and only if their Hilbert
distance is zero. Because of this property, the Hilbert distance is sometimes referred as a
pseudo-distance, since the statement dH(x, y) = 0⇒ x = y is not true, but we have instead
dH(x, y) = 0⇒ x = piy for some pi > 0.
The following lemma shows that a necessary condition for the splitting in Lemma 1 is
that for every two priors pi and pj, the Hilbert distances between them and their respective
posteriors psi and q
s
j must be the same.
Lemma 3. For every (i, j), if dH
(
psi/pi, p
s
j/pj
)
= 0, then dH(pi, p
s
i ) = dH(pj, p
s
j).
Proof . Since the two vectors psi/pi and p
s
j/pj are collinear (with a coefficient α > 0), we
have
dH(pi, p
s
i ) = log max
(ω,ω˜)∈Ω×Ω
{
pi(ω)p
s
i (ω˜)
psi (ω)pi(ω˜)
}
= log max
(ω,ω˜)∈Ω×Ω
{
1
α
pj(ω)
psj(ω)
α
pj(ω˜)
pj(ω˜)
}
= log max
(ω,ω˜)∈Ω×Ω
{
pj(ω)p
s
j(ω˜)
psj(ω)p
j(ω˜)
}
= dH(pj, p
s
j).

Similarly, we have the following proposition.
Lemma 4. For every (i, j), if dH
(
psi/pi, p
s
j/pj
)
= 0, then dH(pi, pj) = dH(p
s
i , p
s
j).
Therefore, as stated in the main text, it must be that the Hilbert distance between any
two priors pi and pj is the same as the Hilbert distance between their respective posteriors p
s
i
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and psj for all s. Similarly, the Hilbert distance between any prior pi and its posterior p
s
i must
be the same as the Hilbert distance between another prior pj and its posterior p
s
j . While those
conditions are necessary, we have not been able to find a complete geometric characterization
on the simplex. Yet, Lemma 1 provides a complete geometric characterization on the space
of likelihood ratios.
C Proof of Lemma 2
(1)⇒ (2). Let λsκ(i)i =
∑
ω pi(sκ(i), s−κ(i)|ω)pi(ω). We have that
p
sκ(i)
i (ω, s−κ(i)) =
pi(sκ(i), s−κ(i)|ω)pi(ω)∑
(ω,s−κ(i))
pi(sκ(i), s−κ(i)|ω)pi(ω) ,
for all (ω, s). It immediately follows that (i) holds. Moreover, for all (ω, s) ∈ Ω×S, we have
λ
sκ(i)
i
p
sκ(i)
i (ω, s−κ(i))
pi(ω)
= pi(sκ(i), s−κ(i)|ω) = λsκ(j)j
p
sκ(j)
j (ω, s−κ(j))
pj(ω)
,
so that (ii) holds.
(2)⇒ (1). Choose any i∗ ∈ I and let
pi(s|ω) := λsκ(i∗)i∗
p
sκ(i∗)
i∗ (ω, s−κ(i∗))
pi∗(ω)
.
This is well-defined since pi∗(ω) > 0. Moreover, since (i) is satisfied, we have that
∑
s pi(s|ω) =
1. It is routine to verify that the posterior of pi over Ω× S−κ(i) conditional on sκ(i) is indeed
p
sκ(i)
i .
D Proof of Proposition 1
We first show that the function
q 7→ 1
n
(∑
i
log
(
ciq
1 + (ci − 1)q
)
p∗
pdn/2e
q + log
(
1− ciq
1 + (ci − 1)q
)
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e (1− q)
)
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is convex. The function is twice-differentiable with second-order derivative given by
p∗
pdn/2e
1
q
+
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e
1
1− q
−2 1
n
∑
i
ci − 1
1 + (ci − 1)q
(
p∗
pdn/2e
− 1− p
∗
1− pdn/2e
)
+
+
1
n
∑
i
(
ci − 1
1 + (ci − 1)q
)2(
p∗
pdn/2e
q +
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e (1− q)
)
.
Since ci < 1 for all i < dn/2e, ci > 1 for all i > dn/2e, and
ci − 1
1 + (ci − 1)q <
1
q
,
the above expression is bounded from below by
p∗
pdn/2e
1
q
+
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e
1
1− q
−2 1
n
n− 1
2
1
q
(
p∗
pdn/2e
− 1− p
∗
1− pdn/2e
)
+
+
1
n
∑
i
(
ci − 1
1 + (ci − 1)q
)2(
p∗
pdn/2e
q +
1− p∗
1− pdn/2e (1− q)
)
,
which is strictly positive.
Proposition 1 then follows directly from the observations that Updn/2e,p∗(0) = 0 and
Updn/2e,p∗(q) ≤ 0 for all q < 1/2, Updn/2e,p∗(1) = p∗/pdn/2e > 0, and the convexity of the
restriction of q 7→ Updn/2e,p∗(q) to [1/2, 1] (which implies that the segment between the points
(1/2, Updn/2e,p∗(1/2)) and (1, p
∗/pdn/2e) is above the graph of the restriction of q 7→ Updn/2e,p∗(q)
to [1/2, 1]).
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